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This paper explores to what extent secondary policy issues are influenced by electoral in-
centives. We develop a two dimensional political agency model in which a politician decides
on both a frontline policy issue and a secondary policy issue. The model predicts when the in-
cumbent should manipulate the secondary policy to attract voters. We test our model by using
panel data on environmental policy choices in the U.S. states. In contrast to the popular view
that secondary policies are largely determined by lobbying, we find strong effects of electoral
incentives.
I. Introduction
One of the defining features of representative democracies is periodic elections. At
the end of each term voters have the opportunity to reward the incumbent politician
with reelection or to replace him with a challenger. This ability of voters to hold the
incumbent accountable for his policy choices should in turn act as a powerful incentive
instrument for politicians to conduct policies that voters reward with reelection.
While there is some consensus that the disciplining effect of elections has an impact
on “frontline” policy issues such as the level of government spending or the degree of in-
come and wealth redistribution, there is widespread skepticism whether secondary policy
issues, that substantially affect only small groups in society, are influenced by electoral
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incentives. Typical examples of such secondary policy issues are environmental policy,
gun control, foreign aid, or trade policy. This view is fueled by two main arguments.
First, political competition is inherently multidimensional – politicians decide on a range
of policy issues during each term in office. In the election, however, voters only have the
binary option of retaining the incumbent or replacing him with a challenger. Voters are
therefore unable to separately sanction specific policy choices of the incumbent. Second,
given the multitude of policy issues, voters may find it optimal to remain uninformed
about the policy choices of the incumbent on many secondary policy issues that have
little impact on them, which further accentuates the lack of electoral accountability.
Scepticism about the importance of elections for secondary policy issues has been
a key factor behind the widespread use of lobby models to understand the political econ-
omy of such issues. The lobby literature portrays the policymaking process as a strategic
interaction between the incumbent and various interest groups, while elections are typ-
ically not explicitly modelled. Politicians are assumed to select policies based on their
preferences over both financial contributions from lobby groups and social welfare.
In this paper we argue that contrary to this skeptical view, electoral incentives are
an important determinant of policy choices on secondary policy issues. The basic idea
behind our approach is simple. Voters have heterogeneous preferences over policy issues.
While most secondary policies have little impact on the majority of voters, it is likely
that there are some voters substantially affected by a particular secondary policy. Their
preferences over this policy are strong enough to induce them to be “single-issue voters,”
that is ones who will vote for the politician considered most likely to implement their
preferred policy on this particular issue. This opens the distinct possibility that politicians
distort their policy choices in such secondary areas to attract single-issue voters to their
platform.
We capture this idea in a simple political agency model. During each term of
office an incumbent politician decides on two policy instruments: a frontline policy and
a secondary policy. Voters have heterogeneous preferences over these policy instruments.
While the majority of voters are indifferent about the secondary policy, there is a small
group of voters, who we will refer to as “single-issue voters,” for whom the secondary
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policy is more important than the frontline policy. We assume that politicians’ preferences
over the frontline policy are common knowledge, while there is some uncertainty about
their views on the secondary policy. We show under what conditions a simple “reputation
building” equilibrium emerges. In this equilibrium even politicians who are privately
opposed to the preferred policy of the group of single-issue voters sometimes override
their personal preferences and cater to the interests of the single-issue voters. This, in
turn, can be sufficient to attract the votes of the single-issue voters in the next election.
We generate our empirical predictions by introducing term limits into the model.
The model predicts that during terms in which the incumbent faces a binding term limit,
he no longer strategically distorts his policy choices to attract additional voters. The
predicted difference in policy choices between terms in which the incumbent can and
cannot be reelected depends very intuitively on two key parameters. First, the larger the
group of voters whose voting decision depends on the secondary policy, the larger should
be the incentive to manipulate this policy. This implies that we should observe a larger
variation in the secondary policy between years in which the incumbent can and cannot
be reelected if more votes depend on this policy choice. Second, the incentive to distort
the secondary policy should also be particularly acute if elections are competitive and
attracting additional votes is particularly valuable. This implies that the variation in
the secondary policy between years in which the incumbent can and cannot be reelected
should be more pronounced if elections are competitive.
We test the predictions of our model using panel data on environmental policy across
U.S. states. This setting is in many ways ideal to test our theoretical predictions. First,
it seems likely that there are only small groups of voters who have sufficiently intense
preferences either in favor or against the environmental policy choice of the incumbent.
Second, while some aspects of environmental policy are decided at the federal level, state
governments have considerable influence over many environmental policies. Finally, the
widespread use of term limits for governors provides us with exogenous variation in the
reelection incentives of governors.
We find strong evidence consonant with our theoretical predictions. Our first result
is that environmental policy differs considerably between years in which the current gov-
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ernor can be reelected and years in which he faces a binding term limit. Second, we find
that the change in environmental policy induced by a binding term limit depends on the
composition of the state population in the manner suggested by the theoretical model: in
states with large pro-environmental groups we find that governors advance substantially
less environmentally-friendly policies when they can no longer be reelected. We observe
exactly the opposite pattern in states with small environmental groups, however. In such
states we observe that governors advance much greener policies once they face a binding
term limit. Finally, we also examine the impact of changes in the degree of political com-
petition on the environmental policy choices of governors. In line with our model, we find
strong evidence that governors are substantially less likely to manipulate environmental
policy if they enjoy overwhelming support.
There is a voluminous literature on lobby models. Following Grossman and Help-
man [1994, 1995] a series of papers has used the menu auction lobby model to explain
the determinants of trade policy. Excellent recent surveys of this literature are Helpman
[1997] and Grossman and Helpman [2002]. The menu auction lobby model has also gen-
erated a large literature on the political economy of environmental policy. Useful recent
surveys of this literature are Heyes and Dijkstra [2001] and Oates and Portney [2003].
Examples of other applications of the lobby model are Marceau and Smart [2003], who
consider the determination of the equilibrium capital tax rate, and Lahiri and Raimondos-
Møller [2000], who investigate the impact of lobbying on the allocation of foreign aid.
Apart from the lobby model, variants of the median voter model have been the
most popular approach to the political economy of secondary issues (see, e.g., Congleton
[1992] and McAusland [2003] in the area of environmentally policy and Mayer [1984] in
the case of trade policy). While the median voter model explicitly considers the role of
elections for policy choices, we argue that our empirical findings are difficult to reconcile
with the median voter model.
The remainder of our study proceeds as follows. Section II introduces the theoretical
model and develops the empirical predictions. Section III discusses our empirical strategy
and the data. Section IV presents the empirical results. Section V discusses some of the
implications of our results for the lobby and median voter models. Section VI concludes.
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II. The Model
Our model is in the spirit of the political agency literature that originated with
Barro [1973]. Recent contributions to this literature include Coate and Morris [1995],
Besley and Case [1995], Banks and Sundaram [1998], and Besley and Burgess [2002].
Our basic approach to modelling multiple policy instruments in a political agency model
is similar to Besley and Burgess [2002]. We extend their approach by introducing term
limits and examining an infinite horizon model.
II.A. Economic Environment
A community with N citizens makes two policy decisions. The first policy issue is
the level of general public spending g. Public spending is financed through a uniform
tax on all citizens of the community. The second policy issue is a binary environmental
policy e ∈ {0, 1}, where e = 1 indicates that the policy has been implemented. The
environmental policy has negligible financial implications for the government’s budget.
Citizens have heterogeneous preferences over both policy issues. We assume that there
are four distinct types of citizens k ∈ {L,R,G,B}, where L stands for “left-wing,” R for
“right-wing,” G for “green,” and B for “brown.” The fraction of the population that is
of type k is denoted γk.
Left-wing and right-wing citizens derive utility from the level of public spending and
have a unique preferred level of spending g∗(L) and g∗(R). We assume that g∗(L) > g∗(R)
and that left- and right-wing citizens are indifferent about the environmental policy.
Green citizens receive a payoff of ∆ > 0 if the environmental policy is undertaken and
zero otherwise. Brown citizens in contrast receive a payoff of ∆ if the environmental
policy is not undertaken and zero otherwise. Both green and brown citizens are, for
simplicity, assumed not to have preferences over the level of public spending g.1
Policymaking is delegated to an elected representative. Candidates for office are
drawn from two parties, a right-wing party and a left-wing party. Politicians’ views on
1A more general assumption that does not change our theoretical predictions would be that green
and brown citizens also have preferences over the level of public spending but that the payoff from their
preferred environmental policy dominates their payoff from their preferred level of public spending.
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the level of public spending g are straightforward: Politicians from the left-wing party al-
ways implement g∗(L) and politicians from the right-wing party always implement g∗(R).
Politicians’ views on the environmental policy are less predictable. We assume that candi-
dates hold some personal views on the environmental policy which are private knowledge
and that a randomly selected candidate from either party is in favor of implementing the
environmental policy with probability pi.2 We will refer to politicians who are personally
in favor of implementing the environmental policy as “green” politicians and politicians
who are personally opposed to the environmental policy as “brown” politicians.
Politicians receive two types of payoffs from holding office (we normalize their utility
to zero if they are out of office). The first is an “ego rent” from holding office, λ. The
second is a utility cost c ∈ {cL, cH} if they do not implement the environmental policy
that they personally prefer. We assume that cH > cL and that the probability of costs
being low is given by p. An important restriction on politicians’ preferences is that
cH > βλ > cL, where β is the discount factor with which both politicians and voters
discount future payoffs. This assumption states that the high realization of the utility
cost is larger, and the low realization of the utility cost is smaller, than the ego rent
from holding office for one more period. The importance of this assumption will become
clearer in a moment.
The outcome of the election contains some randomness due to, for example, shocks
to turnout, lost ballot boxes, and the like. Let ω denote the “lead” of party L if there were
no random shocks to the election outcome, which is defined as the fraction of the total
vote cast in favor of party L in excess of 1/2. Let ε be a pro-left shock that distributes
a fraction ε of the votes from the right-wing to the left-wing candidate. We assume that
ε is distributed with density h(ε), which is smooth, symmetric around zero, and single-
peaked, which implies that the shock to the election outcome is unbiased. Furthermore,
we assume that the support of h(ε) is sufficiently wide that there is always some residual
uncertainty about the election outcome for any realized value of the lead ω.3 Let H(ε)
2It would not be difficult to also allow for uncertainty about politicians views on public spending.
This would simply introduce another dimension in which politicians could signal their preferences.
3An implication of this assumption is that voters always have a positive probability of affecting the
election outcome and therefore always find it optimal to vote if the costs of voting are sufficiently small.
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be the cumulative distribution function that is associated with h(ε). These assumptions
imply that a left-wing candidate wins the election with probability 1 − H(−ω), which
is increasing in ω. Similarly, a right-wing candidate wins the election with probability
1−H(ω), which is decreasing in ω.
II.B. Timing and Equilibrium Definition
There are an infinite number of periods. Voters are infinitely lived, but politicians
face a binding term limit after two periods in office. To simplify matters we also assume
that politicians who leave office never return to office. At the beginning of each period
nature moves and reveals the cost shock c ∈ {cL, cH}, which is observed only by the
incumbent. The incumbent then chooses the level of public spending and whether or
not to implement the environmental policy, which is observed by the voters. At the end
of each term is an election. If the incumbent does not face a binding term limit, then
the election is a contest between the incumbent and a randomly drawn challenger from
the opposing party.4 If the incumbent faces a binding term limit, then the election is a
contest between two randomly selected candidates, one from each party. The winner of
the election is in office in the next period and an identical sequence begins.
We characterize Markov Perfect equilibria of the game between politicians and vot-
ers, i.e., we restrict attention to strategies that only condition on payoff relevant features
of the environment. A strategy for a politician is a rule that specifies the probability α
with which he implements the environmental policy (e = 1) as a function of the relative
size of the group of green and brown voters γG− γB, the difference in size of the group of
right- and left-wing voters |γR− γL|, the realized utility costs c, and the number of terms
that he has already spent in office. The strategy of type k = L and k = R voters is a rule
which specifies the probability with which they vote for the candidate from the right- or
left-wing party. A strategy for a type k = G and k = B voter consists of two parts. First,
a probability σk with which he votes for the incumbent in elections that are a contest
between the incumbent and a challenger. Second, this probability σk is a function of his
updated beliefs about the type the incumbent, denoted p˜i, which are derived from Bayes
4We are therefore implicity abstracting from competition between the incumbent and other politicians
from the same party.
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rule.5 These strategies form an equilibrium if they maximize the value functions of the
voters and the politicians given the other players’ strategies.
II.C. Political Equilibrium
In solving for the political equilibrium of the game between voters and politicians
note that the optimal strategy for k = L and k = R voters must be to vote for the left-
wing and right-wing candidate, respectively, since politicians do not act strategically with
respect to the level of public spending. We therefore only need to solve for the equilibrium
environmental policy choices. We concentrate on the case where γG > γB, i.e. where there
are more green than brown voters in the population; the case of γG < γB is symmetric.
As usual, we solve the environmental policy game by backward induction starting with
the second term in office of a politician. Given that the term limit is binding after a
politician’s second term in office, the dominant strategy for politicians is to implement
the environmental policy that they personally prefer in their second term in office.
We now derive under which conditions the following strategies are an equilibrium
during a politician’s first term in office: green politicians always implement the envi-
ronmental policy while brown politicians ignore their personal views and implement the
environmental policy (e = 1) if the cost shock is low (c = cL) and do not do so otherwise.
Furthermore, green voters vote for the incumbent if the environmental policy has been
implemented and for the challenger otherwise, while brown voters vote for the incumbent
if the environmental policy has not been implemented and for the challenger otherwise.
Given the voters’ strategies, the strategy of a green politician is clearly optimal, as
implementing the environmental policy is both his preferred policy choice and increases
his reelection probability by attracting the votes of the green citizens. The strategy of a
brown politician must also be optimal if c = cH due to our assumption that βλ < cH .
This assumption ensures that compromising on the environmental policy when the utility
cost is high cannot be outweighed by the benefits of an additional term in office, βλ.
Now consider the incentives of a left-wing politician who is opposed to implementing
5In elections that are a contest between two untried politicians green and brown voters must be
indifferent. Whatever voting strategy green and brown voters adopt in this case has no impact on the
testable implications of the model that we focus on.
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the environmental policy. If he implements the environmental policy he attracts the
votes of the left-wing voters and the green voters, and wins the election with probability
1 − H[−(γL + γG − 12 ]. If he does not implement the environmental policy, he attracts
the votes of the left-wing voters and the brown voters, and wins with probability 1 −
H[−(γL+γB− 12 ]. The difference in the reelection probabilities between these two policy
choices simplifies to
(1)
∫ −(γL+γB− 12 )
−(γL+γG− 12 )
h(ε)dε ≡ Γ(γG − γB).
The symmetry of h(ε) implies that, for given values of γL and γR, Γ(γG − γB) is also
the increase in the reelection probability of a right-wing politician if he implements the
environmental policy. The payoff from implementing the environmental policy there-
fore generates an expected payoff of Γ(γG − γB)βλ for both left- and right-wing brown
politicians, which must be larger than cL for the strategy to be optimal.
In the appendix we show that the strategy of green and brown voters to vote for
the incumbent if he has implemented their preferred policy is also optimal given the
politicians’ strategy if
(2) pi + (1− pi)p < pi
pi+(1−pi)p .
Note that this condition is always satisfied for sufficiently small values of p. Condition
(2) states that politicians who have implemented the environmental policy in their first
term must be more likely to implement the environmental policy in their second term in
office than a randomly selected politician in his first term in office. Finally, the appendix
also shows that the equilibrium that we have now established is the unique equilibrium
in this parameter range. The results of this discussion are summarized in the following
proposition:
Proposition 1. If condition (2) holds and Γ(γG−γB)βλ > cL, there is a unique equilibrium
in which politicians faced with a low-cost shock override their private preferences on
the environmental policy in their first term in office if this increases their reelection
probability, and follow their private preferences otherwise.
We will refer to the equilibrium characterized in Proposition 1 as the “reputation
building” equilibrium. In this equilibrium, politicians use the environmental policy to
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build a reputation with green and brown voters. If there are more green than brown
voters, then politicians who are personally opposed to implementing the environmental
policy have an incentive to nevertheless undertake environmental policy during their first
term in office in order to attract green voters. Similarly, if there are more brown voters
than green voters, then incumbents who are in favor of implementing the environmental
policy have an incentive to act anti-environmentally in order to attract brown voters.
Finally, it is not difficult to see that politicians do not undertake reputation-building and
instead always implement their preferred policy outside the parameter range characterized
in Proposition 1.
The reputation-building equilibrium characterized in Proposition 1 depends on two
key parameters of the model. First, consider an increase in the number of votes that the
incumbent can attract by distorting the environmental policy, i.e. an increase in |γG−γB|.
This makes it more likely that the incumbent finds it worthwhile to undertake reputation
building. The reason is that the change in his reelection probability from attracting the
votes of the single-issue voters Γ(γG−γB) is increasing in |γG−γB| and it is therefore more
likely that the condition Γ(γG− γB)βλ > cL is satisfied.6 Second, consider the effect of a
decrease in |γL−γR|, which makes the election more competitive. This also makes it more
likely that the incumbent engages in reputation building. This is due to our assumption
that the distribution of shocks to the election outcome h(ε) is symmetric around zero and
single-peaked. This implies that Γ(γG− γB) reaches a maximum as |γL− γR| approaches
zero and it is therefore more likely that Γ(γG − γB)βλ > cL is satisfied. This discussion
is summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 2. An increase in the number of votes that can be attracted by distorting
the environmental policy or an increase in the competitiveness of elections makes it
more likely that incumbents engage in reputation building.
II.C. Empirical Implications
Propositions 1 and 2 characterize the incentive effect that elections have on the
behavior of politicians with respect to environmental policy and imply three testable
6Note that a decrease in cL would have a completely equivalent effect.
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implications of the model.7 The first and most basic implication of the model is that
environmental policy should differ between years in which the incumbent can and cannot
be reelected. The intuition is that incumbents who have distorted environmental policy
during their first term in office to increase their reelection chances will no longer do so
during their second term in office when the term limit is binding.
The second empirical implication is that this temporal variation should differ be-
tween green states, where γG > γB, and brown states, where γG < γB. In the reputation-
building equilibrium, in green states even incumbents personally opposed to the environ-
mental policy will undertake the environmental policy during their first term if c = cL,
but never do so in their second term when the term limit binds. Exactly the opposite
should be true in brown states, where incumbents in favor of the environmental policy
chose not to implement it during their first term if c = cL, but always implement it in
their second term in office. In brown (green) states, therefore, politicians facing a bind-
ing term limit should on average undertake more (less) environmental policy than they
undertook in their non-term limited years.
The third empirical implication of the model, which follows immediately from
Proposition 2, is that any such difference in environmental policy between years in which
the incumbent can and years in which the incumbent cannot be reelected should decrease
when the degree of political competition lessens. The intuition is that an incumbent’s
incentive to build a reputation in order to attract additional votes should be small if he
is likely to be reelected in any case.
III. Empirical Strategy and Data
An ideal testing ground for the predictions of our model is the behavior among U.S.
7In this model, elections also have a simple selection effect. In a green state, for example, green
politicians have a higher reelection probability in the political equilibrium than brown politicians, as
they always implement the environmental policy (not only when c = cL). This implies that the sample
of politicians in their second term is biased towards politicians in favor of environmental policy. This
selection effect could in principle dominate the incentive effect characterized in Proposition 1. However,
the selection effect becomes arbitrarily small as γG−γB approaches zero, as distorting the environmental
policy has an arbitrarily small impact on the outcome of the election in this case. We will assume that
the groups of green and brown voters are sufficiently small that the selection effect is dominated by the
incentive effect of elections. Our empirical findings below support this assumption. See List and Sturm
[2004] for further discussion of this point.
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governors, who have substantial influence in many policy areas. In particular the imple-
mentation of environmental policy is to a large extent delegated to state governments.
Furthermore, many U.S. states have term limitations for their governors. Table I pro-
vides an overview of the term limit legislation for U.S. governors between 1970 and 2000,
showing that in many states governors face binding term limits after a certain period
in office, usually two terms. The regular occurrence of binding term limits provides us
with a source of exogenous variation in the reelection incentives of the governor. The
general strategy of our empirical analysis is to compare the environmental policy choices
of governors who can be reelected to a further term in office to those of governors who
will be removed from office by a binding term limit. In particular, we test whether the
differences in policy choices between these two groups are in line with the predictions of
our model.
III.A. Data
To measure the environmental policy stance of the governor, we use state expen-
diture data in the 48 continental U.S. states from 1970 to 2000.8 The census of state
governments reports three expenditure categories, which cover most of state environmen-
tal spending. These are expenditures on “fish and game,” “forests and parks,” and “other
natural resources.” All three spending categories record very similar expenditures which
are likely to be close substitutes for voters both in favor and opposed to environmen-
tal policy. We therefore use the sum of these three expenditure categories in per capita
amounts and deflated to 1982-1984 dollars as our basic measure of the environmental pol-
icy stance of the governor. These three expenditure categories account in our sample for
about 1.8 percent of state total general spending. We have also experimented with three
alternative indicators of governors’ environmental policy stance. First, we assembled data
on state health expenditures. Second, we use the index of state environmental compli-
ance costs constructed in Levinson [2001]. Finally, we also examined two environmental
outcome measure, which are state average SO2 and NOx emissions.
Our key explanatory variable is a dichotomous variable, which is equal to one if
the current governor faces a binding term limit, and zero otherwise. Both this variable
8As usual in the literature using state level data, we exclude Alaska and Hawaii.
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and control variables for state personal income, state population, the percentage of the
population over 65 and the percentage of the population between 5 and 17 are updated
versions of the data used in Besley and Case [1995, 2003].
To capture the prediction of the model that the incentives of the governor to distort
environmental policy will depend on the size of the group of voters who have intense
preferences in favor of environmental policy, we have obtained data on the number of
members in the three largest environmental organizations, which are Greenpeace, Friends
of the Earth, and the Sierra Club as a percentage of the state population. We were able
to obtain membership data for 1987 and 2000. Since membership figures across these
two years are highly positively correlated, and 1987 is roughly in the middle of our
sample period we use the 1987 membership. Membership in these organizations varies
considerably across states from a maximum of just over two percent of the population in
Vermont to a minimum of .25 percent in Mississippi.9 We do not have a direct measure
of the size of the anti-environmental constituency in each state, so we use the number of
members in the top three environmental organizations as a proxy for the relative strength
of green and brown voters in a state. This is a valid approach if, for example, the number
of green and brown voters is uncorrelated or even negatively correlated. We will see that
our empirical results suggest that this does not seem to be an unreasonable assumption.
The final implication of our theoretical model, that governors should have less of an
incentive to manipulate policies to attract additional votes if they are likely to be reelected
in any case, requires a measure of the governor’s current support in the electorate. A
simple proxy for the governor’s current electoral support is his vote share in the most
recent gubernatorial election. We therefore construct a variable “margin” which is equal
to the percentage share of the governor in the vote that went to the top two candidates in
the most recent gubernatorial election (minus 50 percent) to measure his current electoral
support.10 Table II provides means and standard deviations of our variables split across
9The ten states with the largest proportion of the population organized in Greenpeace, Friends of the
Earth, and the Sierra Club in 1987 (in descending order) are Vermont, New Hampshire, Connecticut,
California, Colorado, Maine, Massachusetts, Oregon, Delaware and New Jersey. Those with the lowest
membership levels are South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, West Virginia, Oklahoma, Kentucky, Arkansas,
Louisiana, Alabama and Mississippi.
10While an advantage of this approach is that we have a measure that should closely track the governor’s
current reelection prospects, a potential concern is that this measure is endogenous. Section IV considers
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states with and without term limits. Appendix 2 contains detailed references to the data
sources.
III.B. Empirical Strategy
Our basic empirical approach is a simple difference-in-differences specification which
is similar to that used in Besley and Case [1995] and other empirical work using state-level
data
(3) envit = a+ δlit + βXit + αi + ϕt + ti + εit,
where envit is our indicator of the governor’s environmental policy stance in state i at
time t. The regressor of primary interest is the indicator variable lit, which equals one
whenever the current governor faces a binding term limit and is therefore a “lame duck,”
and zero otherwise. Additional regressors are state fixed effects αi, time fixed effects ϕt,
and also a set of state-specific time trends ti. For our basic results vector Xit contains the
same control variables as in Besley and Case [1995]. These are the total state population,
state personal income per capita, the percentage of the population between 5 and 17, and
the percentage of the population over 65. Finally, εit is the contemporaneous error term.
To assess the robustness of our findings we also experiment with more extensive sets of
control variables and allow for the possibility of both heteroskedasticity and arbitrary
correlation of the error term within each state.
The coefficient δ in (3) captures the basic prediction of our theoretical model, that
environmental policy should differ between terms in which the incumbent governor can
and cannot be reelected to another term in office. Yet the model also suggests that δ
should depend on the relative size of the groups of green and brown voters, i.e. whether
γG−γB > 0 or γG−γB < 0. To examine empirically this hypothesis we create an indicator
variable for green states that is equal to one if the proportion of the state’s residents who
are members of Greenpeace, Friends of the Earth, and the World Wildlife Fund exceeds
an arbitrary cutoff level, and is equal to zero otherwise. For our basic results we classify
the eight states with the largest membership levels as green. Below we return to this
choice of cutoff and perform extensive sensitivity tests.
a number of modifications of our measure of the closeness of elections to address this problem.
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The indicator variable for green states allows us to extend (3) by interacting this
variable with the indicator for a governor facing a binding term limit lit. In this extended
regression the coefficient of lit captures the difference in environmental policy between
terms in which the governor can and cannot be reelected in states that we have classified
as brown. Our theoretical model predicts that this coefficient should be positive as
some governors in brown states will be catering to the anti-environmental tastes of their
constituents if they can run for reelection, but will cease to do so once they face a binding
term limit. Similarly, the sum of the coefficient of lit and its interaction with our indicator
variable for green states captures the same change in the behavior of governors in green
states. Our theoretical model predicts that this sum should be negative as governors
who are catering to the pro-environmental interests in these states when they can run for
reelection will reduce environmental spending once they become lame ducks.11
The final prediction of the theoretical model is that δ should also differ systemati-
cally with the degree of political competition. In periods with little political competition
(i.e. periods in which |γL − γR| is substantially different from zero), governors should
display less of a change in behavior between terms in which they can and cannot be re-
elected. The reason is that a governor who holds a significant advantage over challengers,
should have less of an incentive to manipulate secondary policies, even if he can run for
reelection. To capture this notion, we first ignore the heterogeneity between green and
brown states and interact the indicator for a lame duck governor lit with our measure of
the governor’s current support (“margin”) and also enter this variable as a level regres-
sor. Our model predicts that this interaction term should take the opposite sign as the
coefficient δ, i.e. higher levels of support for the governor should reduce the effect of a
binding term limit.
Our final specification combines both the effects of the degree of political competi-
tion and the difference between green and brown states. This specification includes both
our indicator for a lame duck governor lit, our measure of the governor’s current support
as a level regressor and interacted with lit, and also interaction terms between these three
11Note that we cannot include our indicator variable for a green state as a level regressor as it does
not have any time variation, and therefore its inclusion combined with the inclusion of state fixed effects
would cause the rank condition to be violated.
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variables and our indicator variable for green states. These three interactions capture the
difference in the governor’s response to a binding term limit between brown states (the
baseline in our model) and green states. In sum, our empirical model is therefore able
to test the major implications of our model: during lame duck years governors “undo”
secondary policies enacted earlier in their governorships to attract voters, and the nature
and extent of this reversal depends critically on the composition of constituencies and
the competitiveness of elections.
IV. Results
Table III contains a summary of our basic estimation results. Column 1 estimates
the baseline specification (3). We find that governors who face a binding term limit
increase environmental expenditure per capita by approximately $0.79, and this effect is
statistically significant at conventional levels. Relative to the sample mean, this change
represents an increase in environmental spending of nearly three percent. Column 2
extends the basic specification by allowing the effect of a binding term limit to differ
between green and brown states. In line with the predictions of the model, we find that
in states that we classify as brown (our baseline), environmental spending per capita
increases by an even larger amount ($1.12) if the incumbent governor cannot be reelected,
but we observe the opposite pattern in states that we classify as green. In this case the
sum of the coefficients for our indicator of a binding term limit and its interaction with
our indicator for a green state suggests that environmental expenditures are roughly 6.3
percent lower relative to the sample mean when the governor is a lame duck. These
results are consonant with the notion that lame duck governors reverse policies that they
enacted to attract additional voters once they face a binding term limit.
Column 3 in Table III allows the term limit effect to depend on the competitiveness
of gubernatorial elections. Both the indicator for a binding term limit and its interaction
with our measure of the closeness of elections have the expected opposite signs and
are statistically significant at conventional levels, implying that in states where political
competition is less strong, the governor has less incentive to manipulate policies. For
example, the empirical estimates imply that a governor who had a share of about 67
16
percent of the vote implements the same environmental policy regardless of whether he
faces another election or will be forced out of office by a binding term limit. In line with
our theoretical model, elections do not seem to influence environmental policy choices
when the votes of green or brown voters are unlikely to influence to outcome of the
election.
The final column in Table III combines the effect of the size of green and brown
groups and the competitiveness of elections. All coefficients have the expected sign and
are statistically significant at conventional levels. Empirical estimates of the indictor of
a binding term limit and its interaction with our measure of competitiveness of elections
suggest that in brown states governors who cannot be reelected increase environmental
spending by approximately 9.2 percent if elections are competitive. Furthermore, gover-
nors who had a vote share of approximately 70 percent of the last election do not exhibit
any difference in behavior between terms in which they can and cannot be reelected. In
green states, however, governors reduce environmental spending by about 20 percent if
they cannot be reelected and this difference disappears if the governor gained roughly 65
percent of the vote in the last election.
Table IV presents a number of robustness checks of our results. In a recent pa-
per, Bertrand et al. [2004] criticize simple difference-in-differences estimates for ignoring
autocorrelation in data from the U.S. states, which can result in substantially inflated
t-values. While our basic specification already includes state-specific time trends, which
should address some of this problem, we now also allow for arbitrary correlations of the
error term within each state by clustering the standard errors in each state. Additionally,
we also include a more extensive set of control variables, which not only includes state
personal income per capita, state population, the fraction of the population over 65 and
the fraction of the population between 5 and 17 linearly, but also squared and cubed
and a full set of interaction terms between these variables. Column 1 of Table IV shows
that this change has only a marginal impact on the size and statistical significance of the
coefficients.
Column 2 restricts the sample to the period 1975-2000. The beginning of the 1970s
marked a substantial increase in environmental concern in the U.S., as witnessed by the
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creation of the Environmental Protection Agency and the first Earth Day, which attracted
20 million citizens to peacefully demonstrate for environmental reform. Consistent with
this our estimated effects are even larger if we restrict to the years after 1975. Column 3
investigates to what extent our results depend on the behavior of governors who face one-
term limits and finds that the results are largely unchanged. The next column excludes
all observations without term limit legislation, which help to identify the fixed effects
and other control variables. This reduces the sample size considerably, but the estimates
remain remarkably stable.
The last six columns of Table IV consider a number of modifications of our measure
of the closeness of elections to address the potential endogeneity of this variable. The
main concern is that a governor’s vote share in the last election could be correlated with
his underlying preferences for environmental policy. First, in contrast to our assumption
that the probability of a randomly selected governor being in favor of environmental
policy is a constant, green and brown voters might receive a noisy signal of the views on
environmental policy of potential candidates for the governorship, which influences their
voting decision. This problem alone would only bias the estimates of our measure of
competition as a level regressor, but would not invalidate our strategy of comparing the
change in behavior between terms in which the incumbent can and cannot be reelected.
The second, and more serious, concern is that our theoretical model suggests that the
governor’s decisions on environmental policy during a term in office will be reflected in
his vote share in the election at the end of this term, which we are using to gauge the
support of the governor during his next term in office.
To address this problem, we adopt two strategies. First, columns 5 and 6 of Table
IV convert our measure of the closeness of elections into a dummy variable, which is equal
to one if the variable is above its median. While the votes of green and brown voters
will have some impact on the governor’s vote share, a substantial part of the variation in
this variable will be due to other factors. Green and brown votes are therefore less likely
to influence this modified measure of the closeness of elections. Empirical results are
very similar to our previous findings. The statistical significance is substantially better
in column 6, where we restrict the sample to the 1975-2000 period.
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Our second strategy is to eliminate the time variation in our measure of the closeness
of elections within each governor’s spell in office, by replacing it with the governors average
vote share. Results in columns 7 and 8 are also very similar to our previous findings.12
The final two columns of Table IV combine both of these approaches by converting a
governor’s average vote share into a dummy variable, which is equal to one if this variable
is above its median. In this specification we are identifying via a very limited part of the
variation in governors’ vote shares and any remaining influence of the voting behavior
of green and brown voters on this variable should be minimal. The results are again
remarkably similar to our previous findings.
Our sensitivity analysis of the results with respect to the classification of states
as green is presented in Table V. This table makes liberal changes to the cutoff for
classification of a state as green. The pattern that emerges from this sensitivity analysis
is intuitive. In column one of Table V, only the six states with the largest environmental
groups as a proportion of the state’s population are classified as green. Relative to
our baseline specification, which is repeated in column 2 of Table V, the lower level of
environmental expenditures in green states during term limit years is now even more
pronounced. As we increase the number of states that are classified as green, the fall in
environmental spending induced by a binding term limit in these states becomes smaller
and loses statistical significance.
At the same time the increase in environmental spending in states classified as
brown if the governor cannot be reelected increases in size as fewer states are classified as
brown. In the final column in Table V, for example, only the six states with the smallest
proportion of the population organized in the three largest environmental organizations
are classified as brown and the results for this specification suggest that environmental
spending is almost 20 percent higher relative to the sample mean when the governor
cannot be reelected and elections are highly competitive. This pattern seems to suggest
that our assumption that we can approximate the difference in size between green and
brown groups with the number of members in the three largest environmental organiza-
12We have also experimented with using a governor’s first election result instead of his average margin.
While the results are broadly comparable, a governor’s first election result seems to be a much noisier
proxy for his overall popularity than his average margin.
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tions is empirically plausible. If anything, the absence of large green groups appears to
be correlated with the presence of substantial groups of brown voters.
We have also investigated to what extent our results depend on our measure of the
environmental policy stance of the governor. We have examined three alternative mea-
sures. First, we have used state health expenditures per capita, which also captures some
aspects of environmental policy making. We find that the results for health spending
are very similar to those for our base measure used above. Second, we have used the
index of state abatement costs developed in Levinson [2001], which is only available for
a much shorter period of time, as our dependent variable. Remarkably, we find statis-
tically significant effects of the governors’ electoral incentives not only on expenditures
items but also on this measure of abatement costs. Finally, we have also used SO2 and
NOx emissions as a dependent variable. These results are also consistent with our basic
findings, but are only statistically significant at conventional levels for SO2 in the period
after 1975.13
V. Discussion
In this section we discuss the implications of our findings for the literature using
the lobbying model or the median voter model and also previous research on the effects
of term limits. It is difficult to envision how our empirical findings can be reconciled
with the median voter approach, in that it is hard to imagine a mechanism that could
generate systematic changes in the identity or preferences of the median voter that could
explain the variation in environmental policy that we document. This is particularly so
as the median voter model is one of pre-election politics, where politicians commit to a
particular policy platform before the election and simply implement their platform once
they have been elected. In such a model the presence or absence of a further election at
the end of a politician’s current term in office is therefore by assumption irrelevant for
policy choices in the current term. Our results call into question this assumption.
The most widely used approach in the literature has been various lobbying models.
Particularly influential have been applications of the well-known menu auction model of
13See List and Sturm [2004] for further robustness tests, including disaggregated results using expen-
diture on fish and game, forests and parks, and other natural resources as separate dependent variables.
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lobbying developed in Grossman and Helpman [1994] in the context of trade policy. In
this model the government maximizes a weighted sum of lobby contributions and social
welfare. Lobbies compete with each other and offer the incumbent contribution schedules
that are contingent on the incumbent’s policy choices. It is also difficult to see how the
standard lobby model could account for our empirical findings as it does not explicitly
model the impact of elections on policy choices.14
While it may be possible to extend the lobby model by, for example, endogenizing
the weight that the government attaches to social welfare or considering intertemporal
strategies of the lobbies, such extensions of the model hinge on the assumption that
the main influence of green lobby groups on environmental policy choices is through
financial contributions. This seems unrealistic. The Institute on Money in State Politics,
for example, reports that in 1998, which was an election year in all of the eight states
that we classified as green for our basic results, contributions from pro-environmental
groups in the gubernatorial races amounted to a total of $26,856 in those eight states. In
contrast, donations from electric utilities and the oil and gas industry, as two examples of
polluting industries, alone amounted to a total of $837,122 and $1,097,620, respectively
in the same eight states.15 Hence, even in states that we classified as green, polluting
industries seem to outspend environmental groups by several orders of magnitude and it
is difficult to see how environmental groups could substantially influence policy through
financial contributions alone.16
Our conclusion is therefore that while lobby contributions must undoubtedly be
an important factor behind policy choices in many areas, it seems difficult to deny that
politicians implement policies not only to attract contributions, but also to attract addi-
tional voters to their platform. While our model focuses entirely on the role of policies
14Several recent papers, including Goldberg and Maggi [1999], Gawande and Bandyopadhyay [2000],
and Eicher and Osang [2002] empirically test the lobby model on data from trade policy choices. We are
not aware of any work that has tested the menu auction model with data from environmental policy.
15Computed from the information on campaign contributions on the Institute on Money in State
Politics’ webpage at www.followthemoney.org.
16A similar picture emerges from data on contributions to the U.S. Congress which is available from
the Center for Responsive Politics at www.opensecrets.org. During the 1990s contributions from electric
utilities and the oil and gas industry alone were roughly 10 times as large as the contributions from
environmental organizations.
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as a way to attract additional votes, a promising avenue for future research would be to
develop models that explicitly account for the way in which policy choices can be used
to attract both votes and contributions.17
In their seminal paper, Besley and Case [1995] used term limit legislation to inves-
tigate how governors who face a binding term limit change total state spending and state
tax revenue. Their main finding was that incumbents who can no longer be reelected
increased total state spending and total tax revenue. They reported changes in total
spending and total taxes of between one and two percent relative to their sample mean.
This contrasts with our findings that the presence of a binding term limit changes envi-
ronmental spending in many specifications by over 10 percent. One possible explanation
for this considerable difference in the magnitude of the effects is that it is easier for a
governor to reallocate expenditures rather than to increase the overall size of the state
budget. To investigate these issues, we have re-estimated all of our specifications with
the share of environmental spending in total state spending as the dependent variable.
Empirical results are statistically significant and suggest that most of the changes in
environmental spending that we observe are indeed due to reallocations of expenditure,
rather than to changes in the overall size of the state budget.
VI. Conclusion
In this paper we have developed a two-dimensional political agency model. Politi-
cians, who face periodic elections, decide on the level of public spending and on environ-
mental policy. Our theoretical model suggests that politicians may use environmental
policy to attract either environmental or anti-environmental voters. As this incentive is
absent in periods in which the incumbent faces a binding term limit, our model predicts
that environmental policy should vary systematically between years in which the incum-
bent can and years in which the incumbent cannot be reelected. In particular, we show
how this variation depends on the size of environmental groups and the competitiveness
of elections.
17A first step in this direction is Grossman and Helpman [1996]. In their model policy choices affect a
group of informed voters, while campaign contributions can be used to “impress” a group of uninformed
voters. One of the main predictions of their model is that special interests become more influential as
political competition decreases, which is difficult to square with our empirical findings.
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We test these predictions by analyzing behavior of U.S. governors over the 1970-2000
period. We find substantial empirical support for the predictions of our model. First, we
find that environmental policy differs substantially between years in which the governor
can and cannot be reelected. Second, we find that whether environmentally-friendly
policy advances or retracts once electoral incentives are removed depends critically on the
composition of the electorate. In states with a large group of green voters we find that
governors advance less environmentally-friendly policies once they face a binding term
limit. We observe the opposite pattern in states with a small environmental constituency,
where governors advance much greener policies once they can no longer be reelected.
These results suggest that governors reverse policies that they have undertaken purely
to attract voters once they face a binding term limit. Finally, the degree to which
governors change their environmental policy between terms in which they can and cannot
be reelected is systematically related to the degree of political competition, suggesting
that less pandering is done by governors with overwhelming support.
A provocative conclusion from our results is that in contrast to the received wisdom
that elections are likely to only influence aggregate policy instruments, such as the level
of total government spending or the degree of wealth redistribution, our findings suggest
that exactly the opposite might be the case – it is secondary policies such as environmental
policy, which constitutes only a small share of state expenditure, that politicians seem to
find much easier to manipulate in response to electoral competition.
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Appendix 1: Proof Proposition 1
The main text establishes the optimality of the politician’s strategies. We now show
that the reelection rule of green and brown voters is also optimal. The value function for
a green voter is
(4) VG = v
1
G(pi) + β
∑
emaxσeG [f(σ
e
G)(v
2
G(p˜i
e) + βVG) + (1− f(σeG))VG]
where v1G(pi) and v
2
G(p˜i
e) are a green voter’s utility during the incumbent’s first and
second term in office. The latter depends on his updated beliefs p˜ie about the incumbent’s
type after observing policy choice e. Furthermore, σeG is the probability that a green
citizen votes for the incumbent if the incumbent’s first period policy choice was e. The
voter’s reelection probability σeG enters the value function as the argument of a function
f(.) as his voting decision is not decisive, but only changes the reelection probability of
the incumbent. It is straightforward to verify that f(.) is increasing and continuous under
the assumptions of our model.
Inspection of (4) reveals that for σeG = 1 to be an optimal response it has to be the
case that v2G(p˜i
e) + βVG ≥ VG, which simplifies to
(5) v2G(p˜i
e) ≥ (1− β)VG.
Note that under the equilibrium strategies of the politicians, v1G = pix+(1−pi)px, v2G(p˜i0) =
0 and v2G(p˜i
1) = pi/[pi + (1 − pi)p]. Also, it must be the case that VG ≥ v1G(pi)/(1 − β),
which is the continuation payoff that the voter would realize if he never reelected any
incumbent. Substituting this into (5) implies that it would have to be the case that
v2G(p˜i
0) ≥ v1G(pi) for σ0G = 1 to be an optimal response. As, however v2G(p˜i0) < v1G(pi),
the optimal response must be σ0G = 0. To show that σ
1
G = 1 is the optimal response
note that the voter’s continuation payoff must be smaller than v2G(p˜i
1)/(1− β) under the
equilibrium strategies of the politicians. Substituting this into (5) implies that σ1G = 1
must be the optimal response.
To show that the equilibrium is unique consider a green state (where γG > γB).
Recall that for green politicians e = 1 and for brown politicians e = 0 is a dominant
strategy if c = cH . Furthermore, note that in the case of c = cL a necessary condition for
a green politician to deviate from e = 1 in his first term in office is σ1G < σ
0
G. Similarly,
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for a brown politician to deviate from e = 0 in his first term in office it is necessary
that σ0G < σ
1
G. From this follows that in any equilibrium at most one type of politician
deviates from his preferred policy during his first term in office. Consider first that brown
politicians implement e = 1 with less than probability one when c = cL. For this to be
an equilibrium it would have to be the case that σ1Gβλ− cL = σ0Gβλ, which implies that
cL = (σ
1
G − σ0G)βλ. It is straightforward to check with the argument developed above
that a green voter’s optimal reelection strategy is also in this case to set σ1G = 1 and
σ0G = 0, which results in a contradiction as we assume that βλ > cL. Similarly, equilibria
in which green politicians implement e = 1 with less than probability one would require
that cL = (σ
0
G − σ1G)βλ. This is also impossible, as the voter’s optimal strategy in this
case is to set σ1G = 1 and σ
0
G = 0. The argument for a brown state (where γB > γG) is
analogous.
Appendix 2: Data Sources
Our data on state expenditures were supplied by the Bureau of the Census in elec-
tronic format and originally appeared in the annual Census publication State Government
Finances. The Census defines expenditure on fish and game as expenditure for the “con-
servation, improvement, development, and propagation of fish and game resources; and
the regulation and enforcement of fish and game laws and rules.” Expenditure on forests
and parks are reported as separate expenditure categories from 1977 onwards, which we
aggregated to obtain a consistent time series. Expenditure on forests is defined as ex-
penditure for the “conservation, development, management, and protection of forests and
forest resources; regulation and inspection of forest products and industries; and provision
of assistance to private or local government owners of woodlands.” Similarly, expenditure
on parks is defined as the “provision and support of recreational and cultural-scientific
facilities maintained for the benefit of residents and visitors.” Expenditure on other natu-
ral resources support the “conservation, promotion, and development of natural resources
(soil, water, energy, minerals, etc.) and the regulation of industries which develop, uti-
lize, or affect natural resources. [It also] covers activities not reported in other Natural
Resources functions.”
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Expenditure on health is defined as expenditure for the “provision of services for
the conservation and improvement of public health.” One example of such an expenditure
is the “regulation of air and water quality, sanitary engineering, and other environmental
health activities.” Our measure of state abatement costs is the industry-adjusted index
of state environmental compliance costs developed in Levinson [2001]. Finally, state
emissions of NOx and SO2 were obtained from United States Environmental Protection
Agency [1995].
Membership in Greenpeace, the World Wildlife Fund, and the Sierra Club as a
percentage of the population of each state in 1987 is reported in Institute for Southern
Studies [1991]. Our measure of the competitiveness of elections is constructed from the
historical tables on gubernatorial election results contained in Scammon et. al. [2001]
and Congressional Quarterly [1998]. Election results are unavailable for governors which
have succeeded to office and for the 1983 and 1987 gubernatorial races in Louisiana,
when no general election was held. This affects 40 observations which we exclude from
all regressions. Information on the term limit legislation for governors and whether the
current governor faces a binding term limit was taken from Besley and Case [1995, 2003]
and complemented with the information in The Book of the States and Kallenbach and
Kallenbach [1977]. The proportion of the population over 65 and the proportion of
the population between 5 and 17, are also the same as in Besley and Case [2003] and
were original taken from the Statistical Abstract of the United States. Information on the
population and personal income in each state was obtained from the Bureau of the Census
in electronic format at www.census.org. State income and all expenditure categories were
deflated with the CPI for all urban consumers (with the average 1982-1984 prices as the
base) from the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
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TABLE I 
Term Limits for Governors by State (1970-2000) 
States with no term limits: 
CT, IDa, IL, IA, MAb, MN, NH, NY, ND, TX, VT, WAc, WI 
States limiting governors to one term in office: 
VA 
States limiting governors to two terms in office: 
AL, DE, FL, LA, MD, ME, MO, NE, NJ, NV, OH, OK, OR, PA, SD, WV 
State law changed from no term limit to a three-term limit:  
UT (1994) 
State law changed from no term limit to a two-term limit: 
AZ (1992), AR (1992), CA (1990), CO (1990), KS (1972), MI (1992),  
MT (1992), RI (1994), WY (1992)  
State law changed from a one-term limit to a two-term limit: 
GA (1976), IN (1972), KY (1994), NM (1991), MS (1994), NC (1977), SC (1980), TN (1978) 
      The year in brackets is the year in which the term limit legislation changed. (a) A two-term limit was 
passed in 1994, but repealed in 2002. (b) Term limits were enacted in 1994 but were declared unconstitutional 
by the Idaho Supreme Court in 1997. (c) Enacted a two-term limit in 1992, which was declared 
unconstitutional by the Washington Supreme Court in 1998. 
 
  
(1) (2) (3)
All Observations
Observations 
without term 
limit legislation
Observations 
with term limit 
legislation
Environmental Expenditure per Capita 27.09 27.95 26.52
(in 1982-1984 Dollars) (17.08) (17.89) (16.51)
Governor Faces a Binding Term Limit 0.27 0.00 0.44
("Lame Duck") (0.44) (0.00) (0.50)
Membership in Greenpeace, WWF and 0.85 1.00 0.74
Sierra Club as a Percentage of the Population (0.36) (0.39) (0.29)
Margin of the Governor 8.40 7.88 8.74
(7.74) (6.66) (8.36)
State Personal Income per Capita 12.93   13.22   12.73  
(in thousands of 1982-1984 Dollars) (2.55) (2.64) (2.47)
State Population (in millions) 4.99 5.49 4.66
(5.24) (6.31) (4.36)
Percentage Population over 65 11.78 11.52 11.94 
(2.03) (1.89) (2.10)
Percentage Population between 5 and 17 20.85  21.22  20.61  
(2.94) (3.03) (2.86)
Observations 1448 575 873
      Standard deviations in parentheses. See the text for detailed variable definitions and the data appendix for 
references to the sources of the data.
TABLE II
Summary Statistics
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Environmental 
expenditure per 
capita
Environmental 
spending per 
capita
Environmental 
spending per 
capita
Environmental 
spending per 
capita
Lame Duck     0.789**     1.119**     1.749**     2.484**
(0.368) (0.393) (0.583) (0.612)
Lame Duck × Green State   -2.832**   -7.914**
(1.100) (1.580)
Lame Duck × Margin   -0.102**   -0.119**
(0.046) (0.047)
Lame Duck × Margin    0.461**
  × Green State (0.168)
Margin 0.060 0.036
(0.038) (0.040)
Margin × Green State 0.149
(0.110)
State Personal Income -0.091 -0.138 -0.131 -0.189 
(0.852) (0.853) (0.849) (0.848)
State Population 2.180 2.017 2.116 1.809
(1.453) (1.459) (1.427) (1.417)
Percentage Population 0.288 0.284 0.243 0.211
  over 65 (1.166) (1.174) (1.160) (1.165)
Percentage Population -0.408 -0.401 -0.370 -0.388
  between 5 and 17 (0.273) (0.273) (0.272) (0.273)
State fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-specific time trends Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1448 1448 1448 1448
R-squared 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.89
Electoral Accountability and Environmental Policy: Basic Results
      Robust standard errors in parentheses. * indicates significance at the 10 percent level and ** significance at the 
5 percent level. For our basic results we classify the 8 states with the largest  membership in Greenpeace, the 
World Wildlife Fund, and the Sierra Club as a percentage of the state population as "Green States." These states 
are Vermont, New Hampshire, Connecticut, California, Colorado, Maine, Massachusetts and Oregon. See the text 
for detailed variable definitions and the data appendix for references to the sources of the data.
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